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Far-Reaching Problem?
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The author discusses a variety of issues which touch upon
the problem of indoor air pollution. These issues include:
inadequate federal regulation, the proliferation of "sick
building syndrome," proposals for legislative action at the
state level and the recent passage of S. 656, "The Indoor Air
Quality Act of 1993." The author agrees that inadequate
and fragmented authority have created a regulatory "gap"
in the area of indoor air pollution, and suggests that the
passage of comprehensive legislation such as the Indoor Air
Quality Act is a viable solution.
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I. Introduction: The Problem of Indoor Air Pollution
(LAP)
On March 21, 1989, Representative Joseph P. Kennedy,
III of Massachusetts introduced indoor air quality legislation
with the following statement:
Mr. Speaker, take a deep breath. The air that is now in
your lungs passed through several hundred feet of dark,
dusty, dirty ductwork before reaching this room. Twenty-
seven different species of fungus have been found growing
in the dank recesses of building ventilation systems. Vi-
ruses and bacteria that thrive in air ducts have been
proven to cause influenza, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and
dozens of other diseases, including the deadly Legion-
naire's Disease. In addition to those living dangers, the air
we breathe indoors can also contain high concentrations of
radon, asbestos, formaldehyde, benzene, carbon monoxide,
tobacco smoke, lead, chlorine, [and] low-level ozone.'
Most indoor environments have some form of air pollu-
tion or air quality problem. This can result from the presence
of fibers and particles, organic and chemical vapors, microbio-
logical materials, combustion sources, and even people, who
can transmit microbes and fibers within the indoor environ-
ment.2 Factors ranging from an increase in energy conserva-
tion measures (including the "sealing" of buildings) to the use
of volatile chemical compounds in maintenance and cleaning
1. FRANK B. CROSS, LEGAL RESPONSES TO INDOOR AIR POLLUTION 119
(1990).
2. JONATHAN M. SAMET & JOHN D. SPENGLER, INDOOR AIR POLLUTION: A
HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 15 (1991).
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have combined to create concern over the quality of indoor
air.3 In fact, indoor air is often far more contaminated than
outdoor air, and the combination of higher concentrations
and prolonged exposure to contaminants can lead to discom-
fort, irritation, illness and, in some cases, death.4
Newspapers report numerous accounts of the harm
caused by indoor air contamination. Sixty-two percent of
Chicago office workers recently reported illnesses they claim
were caused by well-insulated office buildings with poor in-
door air quality.5 Twenty-six percent of workers polled in
Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, St. Louis and Cincinnati said
they have taken time off from work due to indoor air quality-
related illness, 6 while fifty-eight percent said they felt that
cleaner and fresher air would improve their work
performance. 7
In 1991, James Celenza, director of the Rhode Island
Committee on Occupational Safety and Health, said states
must act independently to implement local indoor air quality
(IAQ) standards and should not wait for the federal govern-
ment to implement national standards.8 Current federal
standards primarily address outdoor air quality, and only af-
fect indoor air when outside contaminants directly threaten
an indoor environment.9 Mr. Celenza also suggested the in-
clusion of specific provisions in collective bargaining con-
tracts as a vehicle to implement standards and to pressure
employers into correcting existing IAQ problems. 10
Since the federal government currently has no standards
for ventilation and no national monitoring methods for insur-
3. Guidance on Fundamental Issues Regarding Management of Indoor Air
Quality 2 (Oct. 1992) (unpublished report, on file with Pace Environmental Law
Review).
4. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 15.
5. Two-Thirds of Midwestern Office Workers Get Sick from Poor Air Qual-
ity, Poll Shows, 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 63 (June 10, 1992).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. States Must Implement Own Standards, Not Wait for Federal Action,




1993] THE PROPOSED INDOOR AIR QUALITY ACTS 315
ing IAQ, ventilation is often regulated according to local
building codes which may address concerns other than
worker health and IAQ. 11 In September, 1991, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) own esti-
mate that "sick building syndrome"12 may be affecting as
many as 1.2 million commercial buildings and up to 70 mil-
lion workers prompted a request to the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) for information related to indoor air
quality. '
Following this request, petitions for a proposed work-
place smoking ban and over 1,000 comments from industries,
unions, individuals and other government agencies were sub-
mitted to OSHA.14 Then, in March, 1992, the AFL-CIO and
fourteen other unions petitioned OSHA to promulgate a
broad IAQ rule that would address ventilation standards, re-
quire written workplace smoking policies, and outline steps
to deal with employee indoor air quality complaints.' 5 By
1993, OSHA had begun work on a report to the Secretary of
Labor in an attempt to determine whether the Agency ought
to proceed to formal rulemaking in the area of secondary
smoke, or of IAQ in general.16
11. OSHA Request for Information Spurs Debate Over Form of Future Regu-
lation, 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1097 (Jan. 1, 1992) [hereinafter OSHA Request].
12. "Sick building syndrome" refers to a group of symptoms, including head-
aches, dizziness, fatigue, and eye and mucous membrane irritation, which often
affect as many as 30-40% of a building's occupants, and which may be associ-
ated with the indoor environment. THAD GODISH, AIR QUALITY 344 (2d ed.
1991).
13. OSHA Request, supra note 11, at 1097.
14. Nearly 1,200 Comments Submitted to OSHA Indoor Air Information Re-
quest, 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1517 (Apr. 15, 1992).
15. Id.
16. Telephone Interview with Akio Konoshima, Head of the News Media
Services Division, Office of Information and Consumer Affairs, OSHA (Aug. 30,
1993). OSHA staff said that no final determination as to further rulemaking
would be made before the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health. Id. Two months later, the Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee approved the nomination of Joseph A. Dear
to the position of Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health. 212 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 4, 1993).
5
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Any or all of the following common indoor air contami-
nants may contribute to indoor air pollution in a particular
indoor environment:
1. Radon, which occurs naturally in soil, is a well-docu-
mented cause of lung cancer that may be present to some de-
gree in all homes.17 Radon is usually drawn into homes
directly from the soil through basement cracks and other
openings.' In 1988, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the U.S. Surgeon General issued a public health
advisory recommending that all homes be tested for radon.19
2. Combustion sources emit gases and particles that are
injurious to human health. These include vehicles whose
emissions may be drawn into buildings from attached ga-
rages,20 gas cooking appliances, unvented gas and kerosene
heaters, wood-burning stoves and fireplaces, 2 ' and tobacco
smoke, which contains at least fifty known or suspected car-
cinogens.22 Pollutants released from these sources can harm
respiratory systems and affect pulmonary function.23
3. Chemical compounds, such as formaldehyde, may also
pose a significant threat. Formaldehyde causes irritation of
the eyes and mucous membranes and may be released from
furnishings, new carpets, laminated wood products and the
press-board used in shelving, counters, bookcases, cabinets
and floors. 24
Formaldehyde has garnered particular attention in re-
cent years, following incidents such as that reported at the
EPA's own headquarters in Washington, D.C. Seventy em-
ployees at EPA headquarters became ill following the 1988
installation of new carpet in the Agency's offices.25 In 1990,
several of those employees filed a $35 million suit against the
17. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 24.
18. GODISH, supra note 12, at 364.
19. Id.
20. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 40.
21. GODISH, supra note 12, at 348.
22. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 41.
23. GODISH, supra note 12, at 348.
24. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 48.
25. Gray Robertson & Michael J. Weiss, Caution: An Ill Wind May Be Blow-
ing in Your Office, PEOPLE, Feb. 20, 1989, at 89.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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owner and managing agent of the Agency's headquarters, al-
leging that toxins which became airborne during negligent
renovation activities made them ill.26 That same year, then-
EPA Administrator William K. Reilly had rejected a request
from the union representing EPA workers to regulate 4-
phenylcyclohexene (4-PC), the chemical that allegedly caused
the harm, saying that there was insufficient data to support
the union's assertion.27 Then, in 1992, the EPA issued a
brochure, "Indoor Air Quality and New Carpet-What You
Should Know," describing ways in which new carpet might
contribute to poor air quality.28
The adverse effects of formaldehyde exposure were fur-
ther shown when fifteen mice died in a series of 1992 tests
conducted to determine the effects of breathing air blown
across nine carpet samples. 29 Surviving mice showed loss of
balance, paralysis, changes in breathing and motor activity,
and bluish skin.30 The test revealed a possible causal link
between the deaths and the presence of 4-PC, which the EPA
had earlier rejected as a source of worker illness in its own
offices.31 In response to the test results and continued com-
plaints by constituents of carpet-related illness, Vermont
26. EPA Workers File $35 Million Law Suit, Alleging Air in Workplace is
Contaminated, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1147 (Dec. 12, 1990).
27. EPA Rejects Government Union Request to Regulate Chemical in Car-
pets; Voluntary Testing Planned, 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 2240 (May 23, 1990).
28. EPA Advises Increased Ventilation to Reduce Carpet-Related Air Com-
plaints, 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1431 (Mar. 25, 1992).
29. Martha Canan, Health Complaints, Dead Mice Prompt Congressional
Call for More Action on Carpet Emissions, INDOOR AIR REV., Sept. 1992, at 1
[hereinafter Dead Mice]. The tests, conducted by Anderson Labs of Deadham,
Massachusetts, exposed each of nine carpet samples to four mice. Eight of the
nine samples caused the death of a total of 15 mice. Id.
A subsequent series of independent tests commissioned by the industry's
Carpet and Rug Institute (CRI) also produced death in mice. Steven Taylor,
Tests Commissioned by Carpet & Rug Institute Validate Carpet-Health Hazard
Link, INDOOR AIR REV., Jan. 1993, at 18. The CRI, which had questioned the
methodology of the earlier study, approached the University of Pittsburgh's
graduate school of public health to conduct the testing in August of 1992. Id. at
1. Following this series of tests, the CRI stated that another independent lab
would be sought to continue the testing. Id. at 18.
30. Dead Mice, supra note 29, at 2.
31. Id. See infra discussion of EPA worker illness, at Section III.
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Congressman Bernie Sanders asked the EPA and Consumer
Products Safety Commission (CPSC) to address the issue.3 2
The EPA then decided to conduct its own research in an
attempt to both replicate the test results and to validate the
test method itself33 In January, 1993, EPA testing con-
firmed that mice exposed to carpet samples died or suffered
neurological disorders.34 Although Congressman Sanders
hailed the results as showing a "direct link between carpets
and health," the Agency called the study preliminary and in-
conclusive, and stated that more extensive testing would be
necessary. 35 The "inconclusive" results of still further testing
by the Agency were presented to Congress in June, 1993; the
testing and results were criticized for their failure to replicate
the methods used by the independent laboratories. 36
4. Asbestos 37 exposure 38 is associated with a number of
lung disorders, including asbestosis, pleural effusion, pleural
placques, mesothelioma, and cancer of the lung.39 Up to
twenty percent of the nation's buildings are estimated to con-
tain some asbestos material.40 The General Services Admin-
istration has said that removal costs could exceed $50 billion
in federal buildings alone.4 1
5. Microbiologic contaminants, such as pollens, bacteria,
viruses, and mold and fungal spores, also contribute to indoor
air pollution, and may be controlled through the regular
cleaning and maintenance of ventilation systems.42 The bac-
32. Dead Mice, supra note 29, at 1.
33. Taylor, supra note 29, at 1.
34. "EPA Mouse" Dies in Government Carpet-Health Tests, INDOOR AIR
REV., Feb. 1993, at 3.
35. Id.
36. Jennifer Silverman, EPA Fails to Replicate Anderson Laboratories'
Tests on Carpet Toxicity, INDOOR AIR REV., July 1993, at 1.
37. "Asbestos" actually refers to a group of heat-and fire-resistant fibers
once widely employed in fireproofing, insulating, and roofing and flooring appli-
cations. GODISH, supra note 12, at 354.
38. It is exposure to airborne particles of asbestos which pose the greatest
health threat indoors. Fibers which remain immobile, and which are therefore
unlikely to become airborne, do not pose a threat. Id.
39. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 51-52.
40. Id. at 52.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 58.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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terium which causes Legionnaire's Disease may reach harm-
ful concentrations in environments which contain
recirculating water, such as industrial cooler towers. 43 The
bacteria may then be spread through a building's air condi-
tioning system.44 Estimates regarding the number of people
affected by Legionnaire's Disease vary widely; thousands of
suspected cases are reported annually.45
This article will address a number of issues surrounding
the indoor air pollution problem. Part II presents an over-
view of current efforts by the EPA and other federal agencies
to address indoor air issues through reliance upon frag-
mented grants of statutory and regulatory authority and dis-
cusses the ultimate failure of those agencies to adequately
address the problem. Part III discusses "Sick Building Syn-
drome," a phenomenon which affects those who live, work or
learn in indoor environments and which directly results from
a failure to effectively address problems in the air indoors.
Part IV examines the efforts of the Indoor Air Quality Model
Law Task Force, a national organization which attempted to
promote IAQ legislation at the state level. Part V analyzes
the latest in a series of proposed federal indoor air quality
bills, the House and Senate versions of "The Indoor Air Qual-
ity Act of 1993."
The author takes the position that the time has come for
the passage of comprehensive indoor air quality legislation,
and that such legislation was passed by the Senate in Octo-
ber, 1993. This legislation would centralize the EPA's au-
thority to act and to cause other federal agencies to act
toward solving many indoor air quality problems. The author
suggests that the lack of comprehensive federal authority in
this area, the potentially high cost of allowing Sick Building
Syndrome to continue affecting millions of workers, home-
43. Bush Administration Opposes Legislation Being Considered by Con-
gress, Panel Told, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1606-07 (Apr. 17, 1991).
44. Cecily Dourrachad, Legionella Claims One Employee Life; Prompts $12
Million Law Suit, INDOOR AIR REV., Dec. 1991, at 14.
45. See, e.g., GODISH, supra note 12, at 365-66. "Legionnaire's Disease,"
named for a 1976 outbreak at an American Legion convention in Philadelphia,
has a mortality rate of 15-20%. Id.
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owners and school children, and the failure of past efforts to
mold a national solution to the current problem, combine to
require passage of an Indoor Air Quality Act this term.
II. Background: The Failure to Adequately Address
the Problem
A. EPA's Efforts Do Not Adequately Address IAQ
Concerns
Title IV of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA)46 required the EPA to report to Con-
gress on federal efforts to address IAP.4 7 The EPA did so in
1989, and recommended six courses of action to deal with the
problem, including: (a) the "significant" expansion of re-
search, to better characterize the extent of the IAP problem;
(b) the development of research related to the creation of mit-
igation strategies; (c) the expansion of research to identify
and characterize sources of IAP; (d) the development of a
program to promote guidelines for IAQ, including guidelines
for ventilation, building design, and operation and mainte-
nance practices; (e) the development of a program of techni-
cal assistance and information dissemination to assist in the
solving of IAP problems; and (f) the characterization of the
health impacts of IAQ problems in a variety of settings, and
the development of guidelines for controlling such impacts. 48
SARA also required the EPA to coordinate its efforts with
other federal agencies. This led to the creation of the Inter-
agency Committee on Indoor Air Quality (CIAQ). 49
Although the EPA claims to have made progress since
1989, the Agency admits that much research is still needed to
46. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
47. § 212(h)(1) (amending CERCLA § 301). The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) prevented the release of the report, apparently fearing that its
release would lead to expensive regulatory requirements; the report was subse-
quently leaked by members of Congress, who were later able to secure an offi-
cial release. CROSS, supra note 1, at 120.
48. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDOOR AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL EF-
FORTS ARE NOT EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSING A GROWING PROBLEM 14-18 (Oct. 1991)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
49. Id. at 2.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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determine the full extent of the IAP problem, and to develop
strategies to adequately address it.50 The Office of Research
and Development (ORD) conducts indoor air research at the
EPA and is intimately involved in SARA's mandate. 51 The
ORD has been involved in the identification of pollutants, the
determination of sources of pollutants and the development
of control strategies. 52 The office has completed research on
the health effects of indoor air pollutants such as second-
hand smoke, carbon monoxide and formaldehyde, and is stud-
ying the effect of ventilation systems and other factors on the
indoor environment.53 However, ORD's annual budget re-
mains below the $10 million the EPA says is required to con-
duct the necessary research.54 Though the ORD's indoor air
funding increased between 1986 and 1990, 55 the proposed
budget of $5.8 million for 1991 fell victim to agency budget
cuts and was reduced to $4.3 million.56
This loss of funding caused the suspension of some re-
search efforts, and led to cooperative efforts between the EPA
and industry to continue other projects. 57 Although the ORD
recognizes the need for expanded research, officials told the
General Accounting Office in 1991 that the absence of a spe-
cific legislative mandate setting forth deadlines for agency ac-
tion in this area has caused the EPA to limit funds dedicated
to indoor air research. 58
The EPA's Indoor Air Division (IAD)59 is responsible for
distributing IAQ information to the public and to state and
local governments to assist building owners and managers in
identifying IAQ problems. 60 In 1991, the IAD drafted guide-
50. Id. at 4.
51. Such research was the "primary focus" of Title IV. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. ORD's indoor air funding increased from $2.3 million in 1986 to $3.9
million in 1990. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The report cites a joint effort by EPA and Dow-Corning to conduct
research related to cleaning biological pollutants from ventilation systems. Id.
58. Id.
59. The IAD was created in 1986. CRoss, supra note 1, at 121.
60. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 5.
11
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lines called Building Air Quality: A Guide for Building Own-
ers and Facility Managers.61 The Guide, which specifically
addresses commercial and public buildings,62 includes infor-
mation to help evaluate potential IAQ problems 63 and to di-
agnose IAQ problems when they actually occur. 64 Although
the IAD's budget for indoor air increased from $50,000 in
1986 to approximately $4.2 million in 1993,65 that figure is
far below the $25 million IAD believes necessary to fulfill its
role of disseminating information and coordinating other in-
door air activities. 66
A 1991 General Accounting Office (GAO) report criticized
the EPA's efforts as "not effectively addressing a growing
problem."67 The report cited several statistics related to
GAO's assertion that the "EPA's emphasis on IAP is not com-
mensurate with the health risks":68
EPA's indoor air program budget for fiscal year 1991 was
$6.6 million, less than 4 percent of EPA's overall air pro-
gram budget .... According to EPA officials, one of the
primary reasons that indoor air programs have not re-
ceived more funding is that they compete in EPA's con-
strained budget process with other air quality programs
that have legislative mandates.69
61. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter EPA
GUIDE]. The document, jointly issued by NIOSH and the EPA, is based on more
than 600 IAQ investigations by NIOSH in non-industrial, non-residential office
buildings since 1971 (and is reflective of that agency's "solution-oriented" ap-
proach), as well as guidance from EPA's Indoor Air Division (IAD). Id. at vii.
62. Id. at ix.
63. Section 4 of the document is entitled, "Developing an IAQ Profile," and
includes step-by-step instructions. Id. at 19.
64. Sections 6 and 7 deal with both the diagnosis and mitigation of IAQ
problems, and the hiring of professional assistance in the event of a problem.
Id. at 45-108.
65. Telephone Interview with Elissa Feldman, Chief of Implementation
Branch, LAD (Aug. 30, 1993). The IAD's budget for 1992 was $5 million. Id.
66. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 5-6.
67. Id. at cover.
68. Id. at 6. The report was prepared for the chairman of the Senate Sub-
committee on Superfund, Ocean and Water Protection, of the Committee on En-
vironment and Public Works.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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The report quotes EPA officials as stating that projects
such as IAQ which do not have legislative deadlines are given
lesser priority at budget allocation time.70 Meanwhile, an
agency task force ranked IAP fourth among thirty-one envi-
ronmental problems in terms of risk to human health.71 Ad-
ditionally, EPA's Science Advisory Board advised the Agency
to give higher priority to funding for "high-risk" environmen-
tal problems, such as lAP.72
Since the issuance of the GAO Report, the EPA has
taken at least one step toward addressing some of the Office's
concerns: the establishment in 1993 of an "IAQ Clearing-
house," which provides information via a toll-free number.73
The Clearinghouse, which was established by the EPA, is a
question-and-answer service which addresses issues such as
environmental tobacco smoke, pollutants and their sources,
air cleaning and ventilation, radon, carpets, and state and
federal guidelines and legislation.74 According to the
Clearinghouse, there are currently no uniform federal stan-
dards that are vigorously and comprehensively enforced in
the area of LAP; instead, the Clearinghouse makes available
a chart of current "guidelines" issued by the EPA, OSHA, NI-
OSH, the World Health Organization and the American Soci-
ety of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning
Engineers. 75
The GAO report also called for better coordination among
the federal agencies currently involved with LAP concerns. 76
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting an EPA report, Unfinished Business, in which the Agency
made recommendations based on the opinions of a task force comprised of 75
managers, scientists and engineers).
72. Id. The recommendation was issued following a 1990 study by the
Board. Id.
73. IAQ Clearing House Handles 10,000 Calls in First Five Months of 1993,
INDOOR AIR REv., July 1993, at 6.
74. Id. The IAD contracts with Silver Spring, Maryland-based RII Corpora-
tion, which operates the service at a cost of about $600,000 annually. Tele-
phone Interview with Elissa Feldman, supra note 65.
75. Telephone Interview with Information Specialist, IAQ Clearinghouse
(Sept. 2, 1993). The Information Specialist further stated that current guide-
lines are generally pollutant-specific and are often "voluntary." Id.
76. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 10.
13
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The Report states that Congress expected the EPA to work
with other federal agencies to address indoor air quality is-
sues. 77 To advance this goal, the Interagency Committee on
Indoor Air Quality (CIAQ) was formed. 78 The CIAQ's pur-
pose, then, is to aid in the coordination of federal efforts.
However, because the CIAQ itself lacks a clear legislative
charter - one which would establish the roles and responsi-
bilities of the member agencies in dealing with IAP and de-
fine how those agencies will work to address the issue - it
has had only limited effectiveness. 79 The limited success of
the CIAQ is reflected in the lack of coordination and partici-
pation among the agencies which co-chair it:80 the EPA, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Health and
Human Services. 8' The GAO report suggests that the fact
that the EPA has a clear legislative mandate to develop an
indoor air program while other federal agencies do not may
be the reason why the CIAQ has failed to establish a national
agenda for indoor air and has, instead, merely published a
list of the current indoor air projects of its member
agencies.8 2
The report states that the EPA's research related to in-
door air issues will continue to suffer because of budgetary
constraints.8 3 In light of these constraints, the report sug-
gests first that the EPA Administrator "examine the agency's
indoor air research budget to ensure that funding for the in-
door air pollution program is consistent with its high health
and environmental risk."84 The report further suggests that
the CIAQ member agencies work to coordinate a more effec-
tive federal indoor air pollution effort by identifying and pri-
77. Id. at 6.
78. The committee was formed pursuant to Title IV of SARA. Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
79. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 6-7.
80. Id. For example, the report states that both the CPSC and EPA have
conducted similar research on the safety of kerosene heaters. Id.
81. Id. at 7.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 10.
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1993] THE PROPOSED INDOOR AIR QUALITY ACTS 325
oritizing needed projects, establishing specific indoor air
pollution projects, assigning responsibilities, setting time
frames for accomplishment of the projects and communicat-
ing both progress and results between agencies. 85 The report
also notes that legislation which would require federal agen-
cies to take a more active role in addressing IAP concerns
"would help ensure that the indoor air program competes on
an equal basis for funding with other legislatively mandated
programs,"8 6 and asks the Congress to consider granting fed-
eral agencies "more specific mandates in this area."87
B. Other Federal Agencies, Current Legislation Fail to
Adequately Address the Problem
Federal agencies and statutes which could potentially
provide mechanisms for dealing with the problems of indoor
air pollution are inadequate and underutilized. Fragmented
authority, perhaps even more than inadequate funding, is a
major reason for the continuing failure of the federal govern-
ment to adequately address the problem of Indoor Air Pollu-
tion.8 8 There is no single agency whose job is to deal with the
variety of issues surrounding IAP; instead, the authority to
deal with IAQ problems is scattered among several agen-
cies.8 9 The following is an examination of a few of the federal
agencies and statutes which attempt to address IAP-related
issues.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Information from a variety of sources suggests that the existing statu-
tory framework cannot support the level of research, standard-setting and prob-
lem solving that is needed to address IAP concerns. See Frances H. Irwin, An
Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environ-
ment, 22 ENWrL. L. 1 (1992).
89. Laurence S. Kirsch, The Status of Indoor Air Pollution Litigation, C432
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 317, 355 (1989).
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1. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)90
The goal of NEPA is the creation of "safe, healthful, [and]
productive ... surroundings."91 However, the statutory lan-
guage refers specifically to the ambient environment and
reserves the power to deal with issues such as indoor air
quality to "other authority."92
2. The Clean Air Act (CAA)93
The CAA, which might seem the most obvious mecha-
nism for dealing with IAP,94 focuses on the protection of the
"ambient," or outdoor, air.95 Although the statute authorizes
the EPA to promulgate standards, called National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, these have only an incidental effect on
indoor air quality. 96 Section 302(g) defines "air pollutant" as
"any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, in-
cluding any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive... sub-
stance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air."97 Further, EPA regulations interpreting this
statute are specifically tailored to addressing problems in
outdoor air.98 Thus, the CAA is one example of the federal
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2).
92. Andrew J. Harrison, Jr., An Analysis of the Health Effects, Economic
Consequences and Legal Implications of Human Exposure to Indoor Air Pollu-
tants, 37 S.D. L. REV. 289, 331 (1992). Harrison quotes NEPA's rather explicit
direction that the statute "provide a context for the consideration of indoor air
quality and other environmental concerns ... pursuant to other authority." Id.
(citing OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, EPA, THE INSIDE STORY: A GUIDE TO IN-
DOOR AIR QuALITY 4 (1988)).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
94. Kirsch, supra note 89, at 357.
95. Harrison, supra note 92, at 332.
96. Harrison suggests that there may be some slight benefit to indoor air
realized from the ban on lead in gasoline and the reduction of other outdoor
pollutants, because these pollutants were therefore less likely to be transferred
to indoor air environments. Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). This definition seems to completely foreclose action
on pollutants that threaten indoor, as opposed to ambient, air. However, since
the statute does not define "ambient air," it is difficult to fully assess the reach
of the CAA. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7602.
98. Kirsch, supra note 89, at 358 n.200. Kirsch quotes the agency's regula-
tions governing pollution control grants as defining air pollution as the pres-
ence of pollutants "in the outdoor atmosphere." He further quotes the EPA's
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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government's underutilization of potentially applicable legis-
lation to the problems of IAP.
3. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)99
TSCA authorizes the EPA to regulate the manufacture,
distribution, labeling, and use of toxic chemical substances
which "present[ ] or will present an unreasonable risk of in-
jury to health or the environment." 10 0 A number of these sub-
stances are known to contribute to IAP.' 10 Although section
6(a) of the Act requires the EPA to impose any of seven "re-
quirements"10 2 on a chemical posing an unreasonable risk,
the Administrator is specifically directed to use the "least
burdensome" of those available. 0 3 Unreasonable risk is de-
termined on a harm-versus-benefit analysis which the Ad-
ministrator "shall consider and publish." 0 4 TSCA explicitly
states that, absent an expressed public interest in specifically
employing TSCA, no action may be taken if"a risk of injury to
health or the environment could be eliminated or reduced to a
sufficient extent by actions taken under another Federal
law."105
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) as having defined "ambient
air" as "that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the gen-
eral public has access." Id. at 358 n.201.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
101. Harrison, supra note 92, at 332.
102. The requirements under § 6 authorize the EPA to: 1) prohibit entirely
or to limit the manufacture, processing or distribution of the substance; 2) pro-
hibit or limit the manufacture, processing or distribution of such substances for
certain uses; 3) require adequate warnings and instructions with respect to the
use of such substances; 4) require manufacturers and processors to maintain
records and conduct testing to insure compliance; 5) prohibit or regulate com-
mercial use of the substance; 6) prohibit or regulate disposal of the substance by
manufacturers, processors or commercial users; and 7) require manufacturers
or processors to give notice to commercial distributors, persons in possession,
and the public of any unreasonable risks of injury from the substance, or to
replace or repurchase the substance. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(a)(1)-(7).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1). This section requires the Administrator to con-
sider a variety of factors, including health effects, human exposure levels, the
benefits of the substance and possible economic consequences. Id.
§§ 2605(c)(1)(A)-(D).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (emphasis added).
17
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Thus, TSCA could present a viable mechanism for deal-
ing with IAP problems caused by toxic substances such as for-
maldehyde, asbestos and volatile organic chemicals. Under
TSCA, the EPA has the authority to regulate the manufac-
ture and usage of such substances, and could require better
labeling and warnings of substances that might contribute to
indoor air pollution. However, at least three impediments
stand in the way of the effective use of TSCA to address IAP.
First, the EPA regulations promulgated under TSCA do
not address many of the chemicals associated with IAP.106
Second, assessment of the economic impact of regulation as
part of the harm-versus-benefit analysis could allow some po-
tentially harmful indoor pollutants to escape regulation if
they affect relatively few buildings, or if the costs of remedia-
tion are too burdensome.10 7 Third, the requirement that the
EPA look to other statutes whenever there is an "overlap" of
statutory authority weakens the role TSCA might otherwise
play in addressing IAP concerns. 08
4. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA)109
FIFRA provides a comprehensive framework for regulat-
ing the distribution and sale of pesticides by requiring the
registration of all pesticides intended for sale in the United
States. 10 Under FIFRA, the EPA Administrator is empow-
ered to regulate the distribution and sale of pesticides "[t]o
the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment,""' while achieving a balance among sev-
eral competing interests, including the economic, social and
environmental costs of pesticide use.112
106. Kirsch, supra note 89, at 366 n.266.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
110. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) reads, in part, "no person in any State may distribute
or sell to any person any pesticide that is not registered under this subchapter."
Id.
111. Id.
112. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). "The term 'unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment' means any unreasonable risk to man or to the environment, taking
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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Since FIFRA's purpose is to protect the public and the
environment from the adverse effects of pesticides, and be-
cause some pesticides affect indoor environments, FIFRA
gives the EPA authority to regulate IAP by banning certain
pesticides or by limiting their use. 113 Pursuant to its author-
ity under FIFRA, the EPA has successfully banned the com-
mercial uses of chlordane, 114 dieldrin, aldrin, and heptachlor,
and has imposed labeling requirements for other household
pesticides. 115 However, FIFRA's reach is inherently limited,
and the regulation of pesticides, no matter how successful,
will fall far short of dealing with the broad range of problems
associated with IAP.
5. The Consumer Product Safety Commission and the
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)116
The CPSA allows the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion (CPSC) to regulate or ban consumer products which
might cause indoor air pollution." 7 The CPSC's primary in-
terest, however, is in those products that pose the most sig-
nificant threats.118 Such "products" could potentially include
kerosene heaters, insulation materials, carpets, furniture
and many other items with the potential to contribute to IAP.
Projects undertaken by the CPSC to address IAP include
investigations on formaldehyde emissions from pressed wood
products; carbon dioxide; nitrogen dioxide and other emis-
into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the
use of any pesticide." Id.
113. Harrison, supra note 92, at 333.
114. The EPA issued a notice of intent to cancel most registered uses of
chlordane in 1974. Id. Later, the EPA concluded a settlement agreement with
the chief manufacturer of chlordane, Velsicol Chemical Company, which phased
out the then-existing registration while allowing the company to sell off its ex-
isting stocks. 52 Fed. Reg. 42,145 (1987).
115. CROss, supra note 1, at 121. The EPA has also used its authority under
FIFRA to ban the use of other chemicals which contribute to IAP, such as creo-
sote. Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a). "Consumer products" are defined as "any article[s]
... produced or distributed i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around a
permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation or
otherwise." 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1).
118. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 19.
19
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sions from space heaters, kerosene heaters and wood-burning
stoves; biological contaminants from humidifiers; emissions
from paint removers and other products; the use of trichloro-
ethylene as an organic solvent; the glycol ethers in household
cleaning products; and volatile organic chemical emissions
from household products.119 Funding within the CPSC for
IAP is limited, and the budget is decreasing. Between 1989
and 1991, the budget for the Commission's Hazard Assess-
ment and Reduction Program, 120 which includes indoor air ef-
forts, declined by fourteen percent.' 21
Under the CPSA, the Commission may promulgate con-
sumer product safety standards to "prevent or reduce an un-
reasonable risk of injury" associated with a product.122
Theoretically, the Commission may issue standards for a va-
riety of products to mitigate the harm of IAP. However, the
Act requires the Commission to "rely upon voluntary con-
sumer product safety standards rather than promulgate a
consumer product safety standard ... whenever compliance
with such voluntary standards would eliminate or adequately
reduce the risk of injury addressed and it is likely that there
will be substantial compliance with such voluntary stan-
dards."123 The Act also requires the Commission to deter-
mine "that the benefits expected from the [proposed
standards] bear a reasonable relationship to their costs," 124
119. Id.
120. The CPSC's indoor air budget accounted for 4.8% of the Commission's
total 1991 budget. Id. The CPSC's indoor air budget is allocated under its
Chemical Hazard Program (CHP), which is a part of the larger Hazard Assess-
ment and Reduction Program. Telephone Interview with Sue Kyle, Manage-
ment and Program Analyst, CPSC (Aug. 30, 1993). In 1992, the CHP budget
represented $2.055 million of the Commission's $42.1 million budget; in 1993,
the CHP budget was $1.727 million of the Commission's $40.02 million budget.
Id. According to CPSC staff, the Hazard Assessment and Reduction Program
accounted for 23% of the CPSC's total 1993 budget (as compared with similar
percentages in the four years preceding); however, a corresponding figure for
the Chemical Hazard Program - and, by extension, the Commission's indoor
air program - was unavailable. Id.
121. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 19.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
123. Id. § 2056(b).
124. Id. § 2058(f)(3XE).
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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and "that the rule imposes the least burdensome require-
ment" necessary to prevent or mitigate the potential harm. 125
Thus, the power of the Commission to exercise its au-
thority under the CPSA is, in most cases, subject to at least
three major qualifications: an expressed preference for vol-
untary standard-setting, 126 the requirement of a cost-benefit
analysis for each attempt at standard-setting by the Commis-
sion, 127 and the often restrictive definition of "consumer prod-
uct."128 However, the Commission has broader authority in
the case of a product which is found to be "imminently haz-
ardous." 29 In such cases, the Commission is specifically au-
thorized to sue manufacturers, distributors or retailers of the
product for appropriate relief.130
The Commission has acted with varying success in the
past to reduce or eliminate exposure to chemicals that affect
indoor air. It has successfully banned several consumer prod-
ucts which contained asbestos, including hair dryers, gar-
ments and fireplace logs.' 3 ' However, in an attempt to ban
urea-formaldehyde foam insulation (UFFI) in 1982,132 the
Commission promulgated regulations that were challenged
by industry and ultimately overturned by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit because the CPSC had failed to
125. Id. § 2058(f)(3XF).
126. Id. § 2056(b).
127. Id. § 2058(f)(3)(E).
128. See Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. Anaconda Co., 593 F.2d 1314
(D.C. Cir. 1979). The definition of "consumer product" as being for use "in or
around a permanent or temporary household or residence" has been held to
preclude application of the term to the structures themselves. Id. at 1320 n.19;
but see Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981) (holding that,
for purposes of Arkansas strict liability statute, the term "product" may be ap-
plied to a house).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 2061. The Act defines an "imminently hazardous" product
as one "which presents imminent and unreasonable risk of death, serious ill-
ness, or severe personal injury." Id. § 2061(a).
130. Id. Such relief may include a seizure of the product, the recall, repair or
replacement of the product, or a refund. Id. § 2061(b)(1).
131. Kirsch, supra note 89, at 375.
132. Ban of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation (to be codified at 16 C.F.R.
Part 1306). 47 Fed. Reg. 14,366 (Apr. 2, 1982).
21
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show "substantial evidence" of the harmful effects of formal-
dehyde gas. 133
Additionally, in 1991 the CPSC specifically rejected a pe-
tition by New York State Attorney General Robert Abrams to
issue a standard for newly-installed carpet and carpet sys-
tems. 34 The Commission found that Abrams' petition did
not adequately demonstrate a link between claimed adverse
health effects and the installation of new carpet. 135 Instead,
the CPSC blamed some of the alleged health problems on in-
adequate ventilation during installation. 136
6. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires stan-
dard-setting for toxic pollutants in the workplace. 137
Although products and activities which create IAP or cause
human exposure to pollutants could be regulated under the
statute, the law is under-utilized to address workplace indoor
air concerns and completely ignores residential concerns. 138
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) thus has a statutory mandate to address IAQ issues
in the workplace.139 OSHA has established permissible expo-
sure limits for approximately 600 air contaminants; these
limits address the Agency's primary area of concern - indus-
try and manufacturing. 140 Although OSHA officials say that
more stringent standards are needed to address the special
problems of the office workplace, the Agency does not con-
sider the risks of IAP significant enough to allocate more
funds. 141 OSHA also has no specific budget information
133. Gulf S. Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983). The court
held that the failure to adequately demonstrate the harmful effects of formalde-
hyde gas precluded a ban of the product. Id. at 1150.
134. Cecily Dourrachad, CPSC Rejects Petition for Standard on Carpet, IN-
DOOR AIR REv., Dec. 1991, at 3.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Harrison, supra note 92, at 336.
138. Id.
139. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 19.
140. Id. The GAO report suggests that, because these areas pose greater
health risks to workers, they attract most of the Agency's attention. Id.
141. Id. at 19-20.
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available for indoor air because it has "integrated" IAP con-
cerns into its existing programs. 142
7. The Energy Conservation and Production Act
(ECPA)143
Under the ECPA, the Department of Energy (DOE)' 44
has been responsible for promoting a variety of energy con-
servation measures which may contribute to current IAP
problems. 145 The DOE is granted authority by the ECPA to
"encourage and facilitate . . .the implementation of energy
conservation and renewable-resource energy measures with
respect to dwelling units, nonresidential buildings, and in-
dustrial plants." 46 Toward this end, the Secretary of Energy
is directed to develop a "weatherization program"147 which in-
cludes standards for "weatherization materials" and "energy
conservation techniques." 48 These standards have, in turn,
"tightened" buildings, reduced ventilation rates, and in-
creased LAP problems. 49
142. Id. OSHA still has not allocated funds specifically for addressing indoor
air quality issues. Telephone Interview with MacArthur Cheeks, Industrial
Hygienist, OSHA (Aug. 30, 1993).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6851-6892(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
144. Six agencies of the DOE currently deal with IAP: 1) the Bonneville
Power Authority, which provides information and conducts studies examining
the link between energy conservation and contaminant levels; 2) the Tennessee
Valley Authority, which is part of a cooperative effort to address the problem of
indoor air quality in "tight" homes; 3) the Office of Conservation and Renewable
Energy, which focuses on a variety of factors affecting indoor air; 4) the Office of
Environment, Safety and Health, whose efforts include the distribution of infor-
mation, conducting of research, and the review of proposed legislation; 5) the
Office of Energy Research, which studies the risks of indoor radon; and 6) the
Office of Nuclear Energy, whose remedial efforts include efforts to lower indoor
radon levels in uranium disposal areas. STEVE COFFEL & KARYN FEIDEN, IN-
DOOR POLLUTION 226-27 (1991).
145. Additional insulation and sealed windows, added as energy conserva-
tion measures, contribute to so-called "tight buildings." This often results in
reduced air exchange rates and ventilation problems. GAO REPORT, supra note
48, at 20.
146. Id. § 6851(a)(1).
147. Id. § 6863(a).
148. Id. § 6863(b)(2)(A).
149. CRoss, supra note 1, at 125. The DOE 1979 Building Energy Perform-
ance Standards resulted in a reduction in building ventilation, and a subse-
quent increase in AP. Id.
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The DOE has allocated $1.6 million to fund research on
indoor air in buildings under the Department's Office of En-
ergy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. 5 0 The DOE also con-
ducts research related to the health effects of radon and other
indoor air pollutants. 151 However, since the DOE has no reg-
ulatory authority over indoor air concerns, 52 its efforts and
those of other agencies are coordinated by the CIAQ and the
Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Co-
ordination. Both of these agencies have limited funding,
however, and the effectiveness of their "coordination" of ef-
forts is questionable. 153
8. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development
The efforts of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) related to IAP focus primarily on specifi-
cally identified hazards in HUD-financed housing. 54 There
is no line-item budget for indoor air at the Department, but
HUD has been involved in projects aimed at reducing the
amount of formaldehyde in building materials used to manu-
facture homes, and has sponsored research to mitigate expo-
sure to lead-based paint in agency-financed housing. 55
HUD's efforts have been widely criticized. Its 1984 for-
maldehyde regulation, which addressed the irritant effects of
formaldehyde in mobile homes, requires less stringent emis-
sions standards than those commonly used in the industry. 56
150. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 21. This office was formerly known as
the Office of Conservation and Renewable Energy.
151. Id. at 20.
152. CRoss, supra note 1, at 82.
153. Id.
154. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 21. For example, HUD has issued Mini-
mum Property Standards for radiation and ventilation in government-financed
housing. COFFEL & FEIDEN, supra note 144, at 228.
155. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 21.
156. CRoss, supra note 1, at 112. According to HUD personnel, the 1984
standard, codified at 24 C.F.R. § 3280 (1993), was the result of an earlier Con-
gressional mandate that required the Department to establish a standard for
formaldehyde emissions from the use of plywood and particle board in the con-
struction of mobile homes (now referred to as "manufactured housing"). Tele-
phone Interview with HUD personnel, Standards and Products Branch (Sept. 2,
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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The CPSC attacked the standard as insufficient to address
health risks, 157 and HUD itself conceded that the regulation
completely failed to address some types of formaldehyde gas-
emitting fiberboard. 158
9. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH)
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), a federal agency associated with the Cen-
ters for Disease Control, is responsible for responding to em-
ployee complaints about unsafe working conditions, including
indoor air quality problems. 5 9 Between 1971 and 1991, NI-
OSH conducted free investigations at more than 500 work
sites. 160 It is estimated that thirty percent of NIOSH's health
hazard inspections were related to indoor air problems. Dr.
Donald J. Millar, Director of the Institute, called poor indoor
air quality one of the "epidemics" of the 1990's.161 However,
the Institute says that funds available for the pursuit of six
"tactical areas" related to LAP are limited. 6 2
1993). HUD personnel said that, in part due to the continuing controversy sur-
rounding formaldehyde's identification as a human carcinogen, there are no
plans to issue a new standard, and the Department will continue to enforce its
current standard. Id.
157. CROSS, supra note 1, at 113.
158. Id. However, HUD personnel noted that current industry practices
often exceed the Department standard for formaldehyde emissions. Telephone
Interview with HUD personnel, supra note 156.
159. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 20.
160. COFFEL & FEIDEN, supra note 144, at 178. A recent NIOSH investiga-
tion has examined complaints spanning ten years from employees at the James
Madison Memorial Building of the Library of Congress. Id.
161. NIOSH Director Calls IAQ One of the Epidemics of the 90's, INDOOR AIR
REv., Mar. 1993, at 5.
162. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 20. The six "tactical areas" identified by
NIOSH include:
identifying methods for evaluating indoor air ventilation systems;
developing techniques to detect the presence of chemical, biological,
and physical agents and to characterize their association with in-
door air problems; studying effects of chemical, biological, and
physical agents; developing a survey assessment instrument for in-
door air quality; disseminating information to the public in re-
sponse to public inquiries; and providing indoor air training.
25
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In 1990, less than one-half of one percent of NIOSH's
$84.7 million budget - about $300,000 in "discretionary"
funds - was spent to specifically address IAP. 163 In October,
1992, following a news report on IAQ which listed NIOSH's
toll-free number, the agency received 6,000 calls; of those,
500 were formal requests for workplace investigations. 164 By
the end of 1993, the Institute expects to have received 1,000
requests for investigations, more than twice the number the
agency usually handles in any single year.165 Since the aver-
age investigation costs about $30,000, and because there is no
specific appropriation for investigations in the Institute's
budget, the increased number of requests represents a signif-
icant demand on the Institute's $110 million 1993 budget.166
10. The National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences (NIEHS) and the General Services
Administration (GSA)
Other federal agencies and programs address indoor air
issues in a similarly limited manner. Research at the NIEHS
focuses on the health effects of exposure to dangerous sub-
stances, both indoors and outdoors. 167 The Institute states
that its efforts to address IAP have been "coincidental" to its
overall research, and that it has no specific budget allocation
for indoor air.168
The GSA, which is responsible for the management of
federal buildings, states that indoor air efforts are only a mi-
nor part of its responsibilities. 169 Despite frequent com-
plaints from building occupants about IAP-related problems,
the GSA has neither fully defined IAP nor decided how it will
deal with this form of pollution. 70 Instead, its emphasis on
energy conservation, which encourages "tight buildings" and
163. Id.
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contributes to some IAP problems, hampers efforts to im-
prove IAQ.171 The GSA has no line-item budget for indoor air
research. 172
C. The Bush Administration Opposed Further Legislation,
Regulation
Throughout the Bush Administration, IAQ legislation
was dismissed as threatening to add an "unnecessary layer of
regulation to efforts already underway by OSHA and other
federal agencies." 173 Then-Deputy Administrator of the EPA,
F. Henry Habicht, said that such legislation would disrupt
the "successful 'integrated strategy' and 'collaborative' joint
efforts between industry, government and consumer groups
that the administration now is pursuing."174 Government of-
ficials expressed fear that national ventilation standards
would burden industry with an inflexible mandate and in-
stead advocated the issuance of "general performance" stan-
dards, including minimum ventilation rates. 175 However, no
effort was made to monitor contaminant levels. 176
Calling legislative attempts at addressing IAP such as
the Indoor Air Quality Act of 1990 "well-intentioned," several
Administration members nevertheless said that the law
would merely "impede and disrupt the ongoing federal pro-
grams" to address IAP.177 They asserted that existing federal
programs were "aggressive," and that agencies had the capac-
ity, "when appropriate, [to issue] regulations under a wide
range of regulatory authorities." 178
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Bush Administration Opposes Legislation Being Considered by Con-




177. Administration Says Current Programs Adequately Address Indoor Air
Problems, 20 O.S.H. Daily (BNA) 906 (Oct. 24, 1990). EPA Administrator Wil-
liam K. Reilly, Labor Secretary Elizabeth Dole, and Energy Secretary James D.
Watkins addressed their remarks to chairman of the House Energy and Com-
merce Committee John Dingell. Id.
178. Id.
27
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III. The Potentially High Costs of LAP-Related
Problems: "Sick Building Syndrome"
A. Introduction
In January of 1987, new carpeting was installed at the
EPA's Washington, D.C. headquarters. 179 Within one day of
the installation, workers complained of asthma-like symp-
toms and difficulty in breathing. i8 0 The suspected source? A
chemical called 4-phenylcyclohexene, a component of carpet
backing, that may have caused severe allergic reactions in
more than a dozen workers, and left still more with head-
aches, dizziness and fatigue.' 8l Nineteen agency employees
filed a $35 million lawsuit, alleging that chemical emissions
from the carpet and furniture have left them with nerve
damage. 182
B. "Sick Building Syndrome" (SBS)
"Sick building syndrome" 18 3 is a catch-all phrase used to
describe occupant illnesses caused by defects in building de-
sign, construction, ventilation and maintenance.' 8 4 There
are a wide variety of symptoms associated with SBS, includ-
ing headaches, nausea, dizziness, throat and eye irritation
and allergic reactions. These symptoms typically disappear
three to four hours after an affected person leaves the "sick"
environment.' 8 5 Some of the alleged effects, however, do not
disappear so quickly.' 86 Damage to the immune system, can-
179. Larry Tye, Indoor Pollution/The Hidden Peril /A Special Report; A Na-
tional Environmental Trauma, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1988, at 27.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Dan Fagin, It's Stuffy in Here - Office Workers; Bad Air is Making Us
Miserable, NEWSDAY, Nov. 16, 1992, at 4.
183. A building may be considered to be "sick" when at least 20 % of its occu-
pants suffer symptoms that disappear when they leave the building environ-
ment. Id. The phenomenon is currently thought to affect between 800,000 and
1.2 million buildings nationwide. Robert Becker & Ted Gregory, Sick Buildings
are Difficult to Diagnose, Often Costly to Cure, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 1992, at 1.
184. Kirsch, supra note 89, at 319-20.
185. Id. at 320.
186. Id.
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cers, and the deadly Legionnaire's Disease 8 7 have all been
associated with SBS.
Inadequate statutory authority has made regulation of
indoor air pollution - and, by extension, SBS - difficult. As
noted above, the Clean Air Act (CAA)' s8 is primarily focused
on protection of the "ambient," or outdoor, air. Section 302(g)
of the CAA defines an "air pollutant" as "any air pollution
agent or combination of such agents, including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air" 8 9
seems to foreclose application of the Act to indoor air-related
problems such as SBS. The EPA affirmed this by promulgat-
ing regulations under the CAA that specifically address out-
door air pollution. 190
The lack of direct statutory authority over the field of in-
door air has left a gap not only in regulation, but in the abil-
ity of injured plaintiffs to recover for their injuries or improve
building conditions.' 9 ' Since the Clean Air Act does not ad-
dress indoor air pollution, there is no corresponding statutory
relief available to the injured,192 and plaintiffs who suffer
from SBS-related injuries must usually resort to common law
theories of recovery.
187. CROSS, supra note 1, at 62. Twenty-five people died following their ex-
posure to bacteria spread through a hotel HVAC system at an American Legion
convention in Philadelphia in 1976. The disease annually affects 50,000 people,
many of whom are misdiagnosed. Fagin, supra note 182, at 4.
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (emphasis added).
190. Kirsch, supra note 89, at 358 n.200.
191. In Long Island City, New York, health investigators could not force a
landlord to clean ductwork in a building whose occupants complained of eye
irritation and skin rashes because there were no state or federal air standards
to enforce. Fagin, supra note 182, at 4.
192. For example, § 505 of the Clean Water Act allows plaintiffs to launch
.citizen suits" to enforce permits issued under that statute. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1) (1988). Although the plaintiffs themselves may not recover money
damages under the citizen suit provision, they may attempt to abate the harm.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
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C. Some Causes of Action for SBS-Related Injuries
1. Express Warranties
An express warranty is an explicit "affirmation of fact or
promise" made to a purchaser by the seller of a product which
relates to the particular product's characteristics and "creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affir-
mation or promise."193 Thus, liability under an express war-
ranty is not dependent upon the seller's knowledge of a
defect, but on the falsity of the representation which the
seller has made to the purchaser. 94 Claims relying on ex-
press warranties vary widely, from suits against companies
providing products which pollute work environments and in-
jure workers, to suits alleging outright misrepresentation in
product sales.
Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code offers
three "alternatives" or means to determine to whom warran-
ties run. 195 These alternatives, set forth below, have been
variously adopted by state legislatures, and define classes of
persons who may have standing to bring suit under a war-
ranty claim.
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected
and who is injured in person by the goods. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is in-
jured in person by the breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this warranty.
193. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1990).
194. Such "representations" can take the form of brochures, sales literature,
advertisements and even conversations. See Mary Rose Kornreich, Minimizing
Liability for Indoor Air Pollution, 4 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 72 (1990).
195. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1990).
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Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any person who may reasonably be expected to use, con-
sume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured by the
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section with respect to injury of the
person of an individual to whom the warranty extends. 196
In order to recover in an action based on an express war-
ranty, the plaintiff must show that she is the person to whom
that warranty extends. In states adopting the most restric-
tive of these alternatives this may foreclose suits by employ-
ees whose employers may be held to be the only party to
whom the warranty extends. 197 However, employees may ar-
gue that they are the "intended third-party beneficiaries" 198
of such warranties based on the presence of product labels
which directly address worker use and safety.
2. Implied Warranties
Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code has es-
tablished an implied warranty of merchantability such that
goods are impliedly warranted to be fit for their ordinary
uses.' 99 The Code provides that goods be "fit for the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are used," and that they "con-
form to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any."200
When a product is claimed to be the cause of indoor air
pollution, the plaintiff may also sue for the breach of a second
implied warranty, the implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose.20 ' In order to prevail under such a theory, a
196. Id. This section addresses "Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Ex-
press or Implied." Id.
197. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 380. Since employees are not often
involved in the choice and purchasing of particular products, they will probably
not be held to be the direct recipients of product warranties. Id.
198. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 380.
199. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990). This section states a number of criteria for deter-
mining whether goods are "merchantable," including that they "are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." Id.
200. Id.
201. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1990).
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plaintiff must first show that the seller had reason to know of
the particular purpose for which the goods were to be used,
and next that the seller had reason to know of the buyer's
reliance on the representation that the product was, in fact,
fit for that purpose. 20 2 The purchaser of a wood-pressboard
product, or the consumer/user of a formaldehyde-based car-
pet or carpet glue, is the person to whom the "warranty for
fitness" extends and who will be able to sue for a breach of the
implied warranty when an indoor air pollution problem, such
as the off-gassing of formaldehyde from furniture made of
that product, arises.
In 1990, a state jury awarded $16.2 million to a Missouri
family who sued two manufacturers of formaldehyde-contain-
ing flooring materials for injuries related to their exposure to
this known carcinogen. 20 3 Evidence adduced at trial showed
that state authorities had conducted tests in the plaintiffs'
home which revealed levels of formaldehyde nearly 100 times
the level allowed under Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration standards.20 4 In their suit, the plaintiffs alleged
a breach of the product's implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, as well as strict products liability.20 5
Courts also imply certain fundamental warranties as
part of some product sale transactions and transfers of prop-
erty even though parties to a transaction fail to expressly pro-
vide for them. One such warranty is the implied warranty
that residences will be fit for human occupancy - the im-
plied "warranty of habitability." In many states, the war-
ranty of habitability is no longer limited to the first
202. Id.
203. Pinkerton v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. CV186-4651CC (D. Mo. Jan. 8,
1990), cited in Particle Board Manufacturers Held Liable for $16.2 Million in
Damages to Family, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1095 (1990).
204. Id.
205. Id. Evidence was presented at trial to show that the formaldehyde-
based resin which is used to bond the wood chip components of the particle
board does not bond completely to the wood material. Thus, "significant"
amounts of formaldehyde escape from the board during the first six months
after its manufacture. Id. at 1096. Defendants also presented evidence of feasi-
ble alternatives to the formaldehyde resin, and showed that storing the product
for six months prior to distribution could significantly reduce the health threats
associated with the product. Id.
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
1993] THE PROPOSED INDOOR AIR QUALITY ACTS 343
purchaser. 20 6 Similarly, apartment tenants may have stand-
ing to sue their landlords for breach of an implied warranty of
habitability for such indoor air-related problems as faulty
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems,
and formaldehyde-emitting carpets and furnishings. 20 7
3. Negligence
Negligence, 208 the failure to exercise due care in avoiding
harm to others, presents an umbrella of liability under which
architects, builders, subcontractors, manufacturers of build-
ing products and others may be held liable for IAP-related
injuries to building occupants. In order to maintain a cause
of action under negligence, plaintiffs are required to show the
following four elements:
1) A duty, "recognized by the law, requiring the person to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection
of others against unreasonable risks";
2) A failure of that person to conform to the required stan-
dard, which is known as a "breach" of the duty;
3) "Legal" or "proximate cause," which consists of a show-
ing of a "reasonably close causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury"; and
4) Actual injury.209
Sometimes, such proof is a simple matter, as in Steingaszner
v. Paramount Pest Control, in which the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant pest control service had breached its duty
206. See Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ark. 1981) (extending
the impled warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers of a home "for a
reasonable length of time where there is no substantial change or alteration in
the condition of the building from the original sale"); Sewell v. Gregory, 371
S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1988) (allowing recovery by second purchasers for a reason-
able length of time after construction, but limiting such recovery to latent de-
fects which are not readily discoverable through reasonable inspection, and
which manifest themselves subsequent to the purchase).
207. See SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 381.
208. Section 282 of the Second Restatement of Torts defines negligence as
.conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of
others against unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 282 (1965).
209. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30 (1984).
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of care when it mistakenly drilled holes into plaintiffs' home
heating ducts, contaminating the structure with
pesticides.210
In the realm of SBS litigation, engineers and building
contractors may be subject to liability for the negligent design
and construction of "sick" buildings when building occupants
become ill. In 1992, Illinois' $53 million DuPage Courthouse
was forced to close just one year after its opening when hun-
dreds of occupants began suffering symptoms such as head-
aches, nausea, dizziness and respiratory irritation.211 Just
prior to the closure, seventeen employees filed suit against
the building's engineering team, architects and general con-
tractor, alleging that negligence in the design and construc-
tion of the building had caused their injuries. 212 The judge in
that case also allowed DuPage County to file a $3 million
claim against the architects and contractor for reimburse-
ment of the costs of remediation, alterations to the building's
ventilation system and costs related to employee illnesses.213
In such cases, plaintiffs may claim that those who chose
to use particular building materials, carpets, formaldehyde-
containing pressboard and other building products had a
legal duty to choose wisely, and "should have known" of the
potential hazards associated with those materials.21 4 Archi-
tects who choose a particular design for a building's ventila-
tion system may be held similarly liable.21 5 In such cases,
210. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 390. The case was settled before
trial for $730,000. Id.
211. Foul Air in the DuPage Courthouse, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1992, at 20. As
many as 450 of the courthouse's 700 employees - including judges and high-
ranking officials - were affected. Id. In March 1991, 20 of the building's occu-
pants were taken from the building by ambulance. Id.
212. Sick Seek Day in Court, 229 ENGINEERING NEwS-REc. 9, at 16 (Aug. 31,
1992). As of May 1993, 140 employees had joined the suit against the architect
and builders of the courthouse. Robert Becker & Joseph Sjostrom, Courthouse
Air Still Bad, Some Workers Say, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 1993, at 1.
213. Joseph Sjostrom, Suit on DuPage Courthouse Will Move to Lake Court-
room, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1992, at 14.
214. C. Jaye Berger, Law: Environmental Liability; Conduct and Contrac-
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builders, architects and contractors may be held to the stan-
dard of the "reasonable person."216 Adherence to this person-
ification of ideal behavior is the yardstick by which
defendant's actions are measured in a negligence action.217
Negligence actions are thus limited by a requirement
that the defendant's conduct has been "unreasonable" in light
of the potential risks. Courts will often consider such factors
as the defendant's knowledge, industry standards, and gen-
eral industry practices when determining whether a defend-
ant in an SBS suit acted as a "reasonable person" in the
particular instance and in light of the threatened harm.218
For example, if the risks inherent in creating and construct-
ing a building ventilation system are appreciable (such as the
risk that an intake may bring carbon monoxide into the
building from an adjacent parking garage), and if the poten-
tial consequences are serious (potential worker illness and
death), then the likelihood of occurrence will be weighed less
heavily by courts imposing liability on those who were in the
best position to act "reasonably" to prevent or mitigate the
harm.21 9
4. Strict Products Liability
In general, causes of action in strict products liability re-
late to two specific categories of product conditions: a "dan-
gerous condition" which is inherent in the product, or a defect
which makes the product unfit for its intended use.220 A re-
cent development in the area of SBS suits is the willingness
of some courts to determine as a matter of law that entire
structures may be classified as "products" for the purpose of
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) (standard for deter-
mining negligence).
217. Builders and architects are thus not held to a greater standard of con-
duct simply by virtue of their expertise under the standard, but are instead
required to act as would a "reasonable builder or architect under the circum-
stances." See id.
218. CROSS, supra note 1, at 136.
219. KEETON ET AL., supra note 209, § 31.
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section states
that the rule applies even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product." Id.
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establishing liability for defects in design and construction.221
Such cases appear, however, to be generally limited to mobile
homes and tract housing.
The theory imposing strict liability on defendants 222 is
particularly well-suited to cases involving asbestos, formalde-
hyde products and chemical compounds used in buildings.
For example, a mobile home constructed of formaldehyde gas-
emitting wood pressboard products may subject its builder to
strict liability for this "product," which has an inherently
"dangerous" condition.223 Similar suits have been brought
against builders who constructed homes with cracked founda-
tions, which in turn allowed radon gas to enter the struc-
ture,224 and against companies whose products were used to
construct a building, and were later found to contribute to
that building's "sickness."
In Austin, Texas, parents of forty kindergarten, first and
second grade children filed a multi-billion dollar suit against
companies whose products and services were used in the con-
struction of a primary school. 225 The plaintiffs claimed that
their children were exposed to chemicals such as formalde-
hyde, which were released from the building materials. 226
They further alleged that the manufacturers created "unrea-
sonably dangerous products," 227 and that they failed to warn
the plaintiffs of the inadequacy of the school's ventilation sys-
tem to protect the children.228 The suit sought punitive dam-
221. See Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981) (holding
that, for purposes of Arkansas strict liability statute, the word "product" may be
applied to a house).
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
223. CROSS, supra note 1, at 139.
224. Id.
225. See $4.6 Billion Suit Filed in Texas Court Against Manufacturers,
School Contractors, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1206 (Mar. 28, 1990) [hereinafter
$4.6 Billion Suit] (citing Rogers v. Benjamin Moore & Co., No. 90-009348 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 1990)). "The suit seeks more than $4.6 Billion in puni-
tive damages" alone. Id.
226. Id. Some of the children experienced fevers, nasal infections and an
inability to breathe. Id.
227. Id. In their allegations regarding the use of such products, the plain-
tiffs are seeking damages under a strict liability theory. Id.
228. Id.
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ages, as well as damages for tuition and transportation to
other schools, past and future medical expenses, attorney's
fees and other costs.
22 9
5. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Plaintiffs can also sue sellers of sick buildings for fraudu-
lent concealment of a dangerous condition. The elements of
fraudulent concealment are set forth in § 353 of the Second
Restatement of Torts:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his
vendee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which
involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is sub-
ject to liability ... for physical harm caused by the condi-
tion after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the
condition or the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condi-
tion, and...
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liabil-
ity.., continues until the vendee discovers it and has rea-
sonable opportunity to take reasonable precautions
against it.230
Here too, the seller's prior knowledge and active concealment
of a severe radon or formaldehyde gas problem may provide
the basis for a successful suit by the purchaser. 231 In the ab-
sence of the seller's knowledge of the falsity, plaintiffs might
still recover under negligent misrepresentation, especially in
229. Id.
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
231. In Rogers, the plaintiffs also alleged that the companies had "expressed
and implied to the plaintiffs that it would be a safe, useful education facility
free of any exposure to toxic chemicals." $4.6 Billion Suit, supra note 225, at
1206. The complaint stated that:
Competent medical evidence of the dangers of using these chemi-
cals in a closed environment over a long period of time was inten-
tionally misrepresented and suppressed . . . in order to cause
persons, such as plaintiffs, to remain ignorant of the dangers.
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cases where the defendant arguably should have known
about the defect. 232
D. Difficulties Inherent in SBS Suits
1. Causation
Plaintiffs must always prove that their injuries are the
result of the defendants' conduct. This presents varying de-
grees of difficulty for plaintiffs,233 who must often rely on
novel theories of causation to prove connections not generally
recognized by the scientific community. 23 4 Complications
may arise when the symptoms which characterize SBS-re-
lated injuries are themselves subtle and non-specific.235 In
such cases, expert testimony often becomes a necessary ele-
ment of the SBS suit.236
Additional causation problems may arise in actions for
SBS-related injuries due to the large number of potential de-
fendants. As the number of defendants increases, it may be-
come difficult to discern which party is responsible for a
particular injury.237 In some cases, such as those involving
worker exposure to asbestos, plaintiffs and courts have advo-
232. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965). The section provides
that "one who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liabil-
ity" for the resulting harm. Id.
233. For example, lung cancer which arises from radon exposure is indistin-
guishable from that which results from any other cause. Kornreich, supra note
194, at 76.
234. See Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
(broadening the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in toxic tort
litigation). See also Alex R. DeSevo, Casenote, Rubanick v. Witco Chemical
Corp. and Landrigan v. Celotex Corp.: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 423 (1992) (discussing the admis-
sibility of expert testimony to establish novel theories of causation in toxic tort
cases heard by the New Jersey Supreme Court).
235. Becker & Gregory, supra note 183, at 2.
236. In the Pinkerton case, for example, the plaintiffs presented expert testi-
mony from Bertram Carnow, an immunologist and toxicologist, to support their
claims that the family now has an increased risk of cancer. Particle Board
Manufacturers, supra note 202, at 1095.
237. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 386. For example, a well-insulated
(or "tight") building that is the site of an indoor air quality problem may be
suffering from any number of ills, including a dirty or faulty HVAC system,
formaldehyde gas emissions from carpet or furniture, or the introduction of car-
bon monoxide gases from an attached garage. Locating the causes of occupant
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/8
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cated the apportionment of liability among all manufacturers
of the harmful product. In Borel v. Fireboard Paper Products
Corp. ,238 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found several as-
bestos manufacturers liable for an "indivisible injury" to the
plaintiff, and thus held the manufacturers jointly and sever-
ally liable.239 The Borel court quoted a 1952 decision of the
Texas Supreme Court, which held that "[w]here the tortious
acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible
injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be ap-
portioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrong-
doers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally
liable."240
2. Statutes of Limitation
Extended latency periods between a plaintiffs exposure
to a toxic substance in the workplace and a resultant injury
often exceed applicable statutes of limitation and threaten to
bar potential claims for recovery. 241 Some states have thus
adopted a "discovery rule," tolling the statute of limitations
until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have dis-
covered, the injury.242 This allows plaintiffs to seek compen-
sation for their injuries despite often restrictive limitations
periods.
symptoms, and then determining responsible parties, presents a difficult task.
See id. at 386.
238. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974). This products liability case concerned an
asbestos manufacturer's liability for failure to warn industrial insulation work-
ers of the dangers associated with the product's use. Id. at 1081.
239. Id. at 1096.
240. Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734
(Tex. 1952), cited in Borel v. Fireboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1095
(5th Cir. 1974).
241. See Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984). The
Fifth Circuit denied recovery in an action filed against the manufacturer of con-
crete blocks which were filled with phosphate slag, and which emitted doses of
radon gas high enough to force plaintiffs to move from their home, due to the
running of the state's statute of limitations. Id. at 404.
242. SAMET & SPENGLER, supra note 2, at 385.
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3. Other Potential Bars to Recovery
Worker's compensation laws which limit the rights of
employees to sue their employers for work-related injuries
may bar recovery against employers, forcing employees to
seek out third-party defendants to redress their workplace in-
juries.243 This bar may be overcome in some cases by reliance
on a "dual capacity doctrine," under which the employer is
treated as acting both in his capacity as employer and as
landlord or manufacturer. Some states have specifically al-
lowed recovery against employers for SBS-related injuries be-
cause such injuries were not contemplated by the state's
worker's compensation laws. 244
IV. Proposals for Legislative Action at the State
Level: The IAQ Model Law Task Force
The establishment of the Indoor Air Quality Model Law
Task Force (Task Force) represents one attempt to encourage
states to take the initiative in dealing with IAP. The Task
Force is a self-styled "national effort ... under the leadership
of the Indoor Air and Water Quality Council, a permanent
task force of the Environmental Safety Council of America,
Inc., and in collaboration with the Council of State Govern-
ments,"245 whose mission is "the development of useful legis-
lative language which will be anchored to scientific and
technical merit, and which, if widely adopted, can help avoid
the implementation of conflicting, inconsistent or onerous
laws in states, municipalities and other political subdivisions
243. Id. at 387.
244. In New Jersey, a 17-year employee of the Department of Environmental
Protection settled an SBS-related injury case under that state's worker compen-
sation laws for $60,000. Walter Lucas, DEP, Heal Thyself!, N.J.L.J., Nov. 15,
1990, at 6. The woman complained that she had suffered chronic sinus flare-
ups, necessitating surgery, since moving to the Department's new energy-effi-
cient facility in 1987. Id. Her attorneys blamed the illness on "everything from
formaldehyde fumes in the carpets to emissions from chemicals used in the copy
machines." Id.
245. Environmental Safety Council of America, The Making of a Law, in IAQ
Model Law Task Force 2 (Oct. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Pace
Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter IAQ: Making of a Law]. The Task
Force was formed on October 10, 1991. Id. at 2, 3.
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nationwide."246 The Task Force set a one-year goal 247 for the
presentation of such "useful legislative language," and
presented a first draft for public comment in October,
1992.248
In preparing to draft the model legislation, the Task
Force organized itself into two panels. The Scientific and
Technical Review Panel was charged with the review of all
available information related to "sick building syndrome,"
state of the art IAQ research, current standards, and mainte-
nance and ventilation programs.249 The Legal and Statutory
Review Panel Legal Committee was charged with research-
ing IAQ statutes at the state and federal level, including any
pending legislation.250 Throughout the drafting process, the
Task Force sought to follow an "[o]pen and [diemocratic
[p]rocess" 251 by publishing notices of meetings, encouraging
participation by both industry and the public, and inviting
"comments" at each stage of the process. 252
In its report, the Legal and Statutory Review Panel
Legal Committee made a number of recommendations, and
defined the potential reach of the Model Law. The Legal
Committee determined that any proposed legislation "must
be based on sound science," but concluded that much of what
is needed is currently available, and the passage of scientific
"study bills" in all 50 states would be wasteful. 253 The Legal
Committee instead determined:
246. Id.
247. Id. at 3.
248. Environmental Safety Council of America, National IAQ Model Law
Task Force Schedules Final Round of "Public Comments" Following its Planned
Introduction at "IAQ 92" Conference October 20 in San Francisco, in IAQ Model
Law Task Force 1 (Oct. 1992) (unpublished press release dated Sept. 8, 1992, on
file with Pace Environmental Law Review). This "Draft for Comment" was in-
tended for use by states and municipalities during the 1993 legislative season.
Id.
249. IAQ: Making of a Law, supra note 245, at 4.
250. Id. at 3-4.
251. Id. at 2.
252. Id.
253. Environmental Safety Council of America, Findings and Recommenda-
tions of the Legal and Statutory Review Committee, in IAQ Model Law Task
Force 1 (1992) (unpublished report, on file with Pace Environmental Law
Review).
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that the Model Law be a combined substantive and study
bill focusing on maintenance and a multi-tiered complaint
process to improve [IAQ]. In addition, recordkeeping
would be a critical element of the process creating a situa-
tion where market forces compel compliance. The Legal
Committee believes that this type of model law will pro-
mote improved [IAQ] with a solid scientific basis without
imposing economic or operational burdens which the real
estate industry cannot sustain.254
The Legal Committee further recommended that the Model
Law include both "(i) substantive regulation to the extent jus-
tified by the [findings of the] Scientific and Technical Review
Committee... and (ii) provisions setting out areas requiring
further study."255
The Legal Committee said that the Model Law's applica-
tion should focus on "multi-story non-industrial, non-residen-
tial buildings, both public and private," including office
buildings and hospitals, and that the primary burden should
fall upon the owner to conduct maintenance, maintain
records and respond to occupant complaints. 25 6 Such a sys-
tem would also compel tenants to notify landlords of proposed
renovations or other situations that could potentially affect
building IAQ. 257
The Model Law itself is geared toward administration by
a state's health agency, which would implement the pro-
grams listed in an effort "to reduce the threat to human
health posed by exposure" to IAP.258 The Model Law would
require a state to develop a "performance-based [IAQ] man-
agement plan to reduce contamination of indoor air,"259 de-
velop an elaborate program for reporting and responding to
complaints,260 designate an IAQ representative (to act as a
liaison between tenants, employees, government agencies,
254. Id. at 5.
255. Id. at 1.
256. Id. at 2.
257. Id.
258. MODEL IAQ LAw pmbl. (1992) (draft).
259. Id. § 2(1).
260. Id. § 7.
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and others on IAQ-related issues) in every "applicable" build-
ing,26 1 and create a temporary "Commission on Indoor Air
Quality."262
V. Proposed Federal Legislation: The Indoor Air
Quality Acts of 1993
A. The House Bill: H.R. 1930
On April 29, 1993, Congressman Joseph P. Kennedy, III
introduced the latest in a series of legislative attempts to ad-
dress LAP, the Indoor Air Quality Act of 1993.263 The House
bill states that "[indoor air contaminants pose a significant
threat to public health,"264 and states as its three-fold
purpose:
(1) to develop and coordinate through the Environmental
Protection Agency a comprehensive Federal program of re-
search and development to assess the seriousness and the
extent of indoor air contamination and the human health
effects of indoor air contaminants, and to reduce human
exposure to such contaminants;
(2) to ensure coordination and effective application of Fed-
eral authorities to reduce human exposure to indoor air
contaminants;
(3) to provide support to State governments to augment
the efforts of the Federal Government to reduce human ex-
posure to indoor air contaminants. 265
In its current form, H.R. 1930 provides for a number of
research activities aimed at assessing the threat currently
261. Id. § 8. "This act applies to all multi-story, non-industrial, commercial/
office buildings both public and private, regardless of whether they are new or
existing construction, but does not apply to residential uses of real property."
Id. § 5(1).
262. Id. § 9.
263. H.R. 1930, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
264. Id. § 2(3). The bill defines "indoor air contaminant" as "any chemical
substance or biological organism, including combinations or mixtures of sub-
stances or organisms, known to occur in indoor air which have an adverse effect
on human health." Id. § 4(3).
265. Id. § 3.
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posed by contaminants in the indoor air.266 The research, de-
velopment and demonstration program contemplated by the
bill would be administered by the EPA in conjunction with
the National Institute of Standards and Technology and
"other appropriate Federal agencies." 267 The program in-
cludes a "technology demonstration program," geared toward
the development and demonstration of methods for reducing
exposure to indoor air contaminants 268 and allowing for coop-
erative agreements between the EPA and other public and
private agencies for subsidies of up to seventy-five percent for
demonstration projects which propose to alleviate indoor air
problems.269
Research in the areas of chemical sensitivity disorders
and indoor allergens is also required by the House bill,27° as
is the preparation of a "healthy buildings baseline study."27 '
The baseline study will research "indoor air quality in non-
residential, nonindustrial buildings that comply with gener-
ally accepted principles of proper design, maintenance, and
operation of ventilation, filtration, and other building sys-
tems," including relevant guidelines issued by the American
Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning
Engineers. 272
H.R. 1930 also makes indoor air concerns a "considera-
tion" in promulgating further standards under existing stat-
utes such as the CAA.27 3 This provision may serve to expand
the reach of the CAA (and the corresponding authority of the
EPA) in addressing indoor air quality problems. The bill
states that
266. Id. § 5.
267. Id. §§ 5(b)(1)(2).
268. Id. § 5(c)(1).
269. Id. § 5(c)(4). The bill allows some flexibility in the use of funds for re-
search by certain educational facilities, and to conduct research "of a basic na-
ture which would not otherwise be undertaken." Id.
270. Id. §§ 5(f)-(g). Such studies are to be conducted through an agreement
between the EPA and the National Academy of Sciences for the Board on Envi-
ronmental Studies and Toxicology, and the National Academy of Sciences for
the Institute of Medicine, respectively.
271. Id. § 5(h).
272. Id.
273. Id. § 5(d).
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[t]he Administrator shall, when appropriate, consider in-
door human exposure to a contaminant in the development
of ambient air quality standards under section 109 and na-
tional emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. 274
Thus, ambient air quality standards might be promulgated
which reflect a reduced threshold for those contaminants
presenting greater danger when trapped within structures
such as office buildings, schools and homes.
Section 6 of the House bill describes "management prac-
tices to reduce indoor air contamination."275 It provides for
the issuance of technology bulletins 276 and health adviso-
ries, 277 requires the creation of a training course in "model
building management practices,"278 creates a program to ex-
amine and assess the effectiveness of existing ventilation
standards, 279 and establishes the Indoor Air Quality Informa-
tion Clearinghouse.28 0 The section also includes two subsec-
tions which require the assistance of other federal agencies in
working toward the establishment of new standards for spe-
cific classes of pollutants. 281
Under the first of these subsections, section 6(f), the
CPSC is required to "develop specific test methods for the
identification of respiratory irritants, such as ozone, formal-
dehyde, and methyl ethyl ketone, for purposes of regulation
274. Id.
275. Id. § 6.
276. Id. § 6(a).
277. Id. § 6(c). Such advisories must contain a description of the particular
contaminant, evaluate the adverse health effects of exposure to various concen-
trations of contaminants, describe current standards or action levels related to
the contaminant, and include other related information. See id. §§ 6(c)(1)(A)-
(H). The bill requires the issuance of six such bulletins within 18 months of its
enactment. Id. § 6(c)(4).
278. Id. § 6(b). The deadline for the creation of such programs is two years
following the bill's enactment. Id. § 6(b)(2).
279. Id. § 6(e). The House bill requires the submission to Congress of a pro-
gress report by the EPA which includes activities related to the ventilation pro-
gram analyses and other required research. Id. §§ 11(1)-(6).
280. The IAQ Information Clearinghouse has, however, already been estab-
lished. See supra Part II for a discussion of the "hotline."
281. H.R. 1930, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6(f)-(g) (1993).
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of such substances under the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act [FHSA]."22 The subsection contains a corresponding
provision which amends section 2(j) of the FHSA to include a
reference to "respiratory irritants."283 Section 6(g) makes a
similar requirement concerning the committee created by
section 4(e)(1)(A) of TSCA.284 The House bill requires that
committee to review a number of indoor air contaminants for
potential inclusion "in a priority list."285
The creation of a "national indoor air quality response
strategy" represents another of the House bill's attempts at
advancing its goal of coordinating federal authority.286 The
response strategy is to be designed and published by the
EPA, in conjunction with NIOSH, the DOE, the CPSC and
"other appropriate federal agencies."28 7 The strategy, which
must provide for the implementation of a variety of response
actions to reduce human exposure to indoor air contami-
nants, 288 must include a description of specific response ac-
tions which are based in existing authority under each of the
following:2 9 The CAA, TSCA, FIFRA, Safe Drinking Water
Act, CPSA, OSHA, and "other regulatory and related authori-
ties provided under any other Federal statute."29 °
B. The Senate Bill: S. 656
The Senate version of the Indoor Air Quality Act of 1993,
S. 656, was introduced by Maine Senator George A. Mitchell
on March 25, 1993.291 Seven months later, on October 29,
1993, the bill passed in the Senate.292 Although S. 656 is
similar to its counterpart in many respects, 293 there are sev-
282. Id. § 6(f)(1).
283. Id. § 6(f)(2).
284. Id. § 6(g).
285. Id.
286. Id. § 7.
287. Id. § (7)(a)(1).
288. Id. § 7(a)(2).
289. Id. § 7(b).
290. Id. §§ 7(b)(1)-(7).
291. S. 656, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
292. 139 CONG. REC. 814,685 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1993).
293. For example, the Senate bill also includes a program to encourage ac-
tion at the state and local level. S. 696 § 10.
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eral important differences between the two versions. First,
the Senate bill assigns more detailed research and related
tasks to particular federal agencies than does the House
bill;294 and, second, the Senate bill specifically recognizes and
attempts to address SBS, finding that "as many as [twenty
percent] of office workers may be exposed to environmental
conditions manifested as 'sick building syndrome.'" 295
The Senate bill assigns particular research tasks to a va-
riety of federal agencies, including OSHA and NIOSH, 296
HUD and DOE,297 the Department of Transportation
(DOT),298 and NASA, 299 all of whom must coordinate those
efforts through the EPA's national research, development
and demonstration program.300 The Senate bill's "ventilation
program" 30 1 also focuses on coordinated research efforts, us-
ing data from a number of sources related to current ventila-
294. Id. § 5(b).
295. See id. § 2(10). The Senate bill's concern over the incidence of SBS is
reflected in the requirements of its research, development and demonstration
program, wherein the bill requires research to identify "building classes or
types and design features or characteristics which increase the likelihood of ex-
posure to indoor air contaminants." See id. § 5(b)(5). Further, sections of the
Senate bill address the need for the development of building design criteria,
alternate building materials and products, and processes for removing indoor
air contaminants from the environment. Id. §§ 5(b)(14)-(15). The bill's Na-
tional IAQ Response Plan also addresses the inclusion of SBS, stating that an
"identification of remedies" to SBS shall be included in supporting actions un-
dertaken as part of the response plan. Id. § 8(c)(9).
296. Both OSHA and NIOSH are principally charged with conducting re-
search to determine the exposure of workers to indoor air contaminants, and
the corresponding costs of reduced productivity, increased use of sick time and
increased worker compensation claims. Id. § 5(b)(16).
297. HUD and DOE, in conjunction with the Administrator, would be re-
quired to research "methods for assessing the potential for indoor air contami-
nation of new construction," and "design measures to avoid indoor air
pollution." Id. § 5(b)(17).
298. The DOT, in conjunction with the Administrator, would be required to
conduct research concerning the potential for indoor air contamination in public
and private transportation and to design methods to avoid such contamination.
Id. § 5(b)(18).
299. NASA, again in conjunction with the Administrator, would be assigned
the task of researching the use of indoor foliage as a means to reduce indoor air
pollution. Id. § 5(b)(19).
300. Id. § 5(b).
301. Id. § 6(d).
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tion standards in an effort to "determine the adequacy of
[those] standards for protecting public health and promoting
worker productivity."30 2 S. 656 next calls for the issuance of a
list of indoor air contaminants to be published in the Federal
Register, outlining known indoor air contaminants. 303 The
list is to be updated periodically,30 4 and the "listing" of a par-
ticular contaminant is, according to the bill's most current
form, subject to judicial review. 305
The S. 656 requirement that the EPA develop a national
response plan was called "key" by Senator Mitchell upon the
bill's passage in October, 1993.306 The plan's purpose is to
"identify and schedule needed actions by EPA and other Fed-
eral agencies under the authority in existing statutes."30 7 The
plan is thus dependent upon existing statutory authority, and
"the bill does not confer any new regulatory authority."308
The Senate acknowledged the support of EPA Adminis-
trator Carol Browner,30 9 and also stated that the assignment
of primary authority to coordinate federal IAQ efforts to the
EPA reflects the need to correct the "scatter[ing of authority]
among at least half a dozen major federal agencies and de-
partments."3 10 Instead, the bill will "expand the institutional
base" which presently exists in an effort to deal with the
problem of IAP.311 An Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
Quality, which will be created within the EPA, will be re-
302. Id. at § 6(d)(2)(B).
303. Id. § 7(a). The list "shall include, at a minimum, benzene, biological
contaminants, carbon monoxide, formaldehyde, lead, methylene chloride, nitro-
gen oxide, particulate matter, asbestos, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs), and radon." Id. § 7(a)(3).
304. Id. § 7(a)(2).
305. Amendment no. 1092, passed by the Senate on October 29, 1993, de-
leted a provision in the bill's original form which would have made the listing of
indoor air contaminants exempt from the judicial review requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 139 Cong. Rec. S14,684 (daily ed. Oct.
29, 1993).
306. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,682 (daily ed. October 29, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Mitchell).
307. Id. (emphasis added).
308. Id. at S14,681 (statement of Sen. Baucus).
309. Id. (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
310. Id. (statement of Sen. Baucus).
311. Id. at S14,683 (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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quired "to manage indoor air activities and work with other
federal agencies."3 12 The coordination of efforts among fed-
eral agencies will, in turn, be monitored by the Council on
Indoor Air Quality (CIAQ).3 13
VI. Analysis
The need for comprehensive legislation in the area of in-
door air pollution is clear. The problem is well-defined; ex-
isting scientific data supports the growing concern over the
quality of indoor air.3 14 The health-effects are real and quan-
tifiable; employee lost work time and the filing of tort suits
attest to the immediacy of this issue.315 Further, the lack of
federal involvement in concrete and effective solutions up to
this point has become apparent as unions and other groups
petition for action,316 and a nationwide task force attempts to
circumvent the federal government through a proposal for
state-implemented model indoor air legislation.3 17
The efforts of federal legislators to enact comprehensive
indoor air legislation have failed repeatedly in the past.3 18
Existing federal legislation grants inadequate and frag-
mented authority to a variety of governmental agencies 319
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. GODISH, supra note 12, at 339.
315. IAP-related lawsuits have been filed under a variety of theories of liabil-
ity, including negligence, strict liability, and breach of expressed or implied
warranties. See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs suit for negli-
gence, strict liability and failure to warn, stemming from exposure to radiation
in their home); Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981) (extending
the warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers of defective homes, and
holding that a home is a 'product" for purposes of state strict liability statute).
316. Nearly 1,200 Comments Submitted to OSHA Indoor Air Information Re-
quest, supra note 14, at 1517.
317. IAQ: Making of a Law, supra note 245, at 2. The IAQ Model Law Task
Force's "mission has been the development of useful legislative language which
will be anchored to scientific and technical merit, and which, if widely adopted,
can help avoid the implementation of conflicting, inconsistent or onerous laws
in states, municipalities and other political subdivisions nationwide."
318. To date, a series of prior "Indoor Air Quality Acts" have not achieved
passage. The last such attempt, the Indoor Air Quality Act of 1991, S. 455,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), likewise failed to achieve passage.
319. GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 6.
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and has proven ineffective thus far in dealing with the prob-
lem. Federal agencies themselves are either unable (due to
budgetary or other problems) or unwilling to undertake a co-
operative effort. 320 Further, the regulatory gap created by
this fragmented authority is not widely addressed by state
legislation, which is inconsistent and, in most cases, inade-
quate to deal with the problems of indoor air.321 Additionally,
efforts by the IAQ Model Law Task Force and other private-
sector groups to encourage legislation on the state level will,
at best, suggest legislative "language"322 that is not binding
on any state. Thus, the need for comprehensive federal gui-
dance remains clear.
This guidance must go well beyond current efforts, which
tend to deal reactively with problems caused by indoor air
pollution. Such efforts have included attempts by the
CPSC323 to ban workplace chemicals and causative agents
only after those exposed have become ill, and proposing or un-
dertaking increased ventilation rates only after problems de-
velop within building HVAC systems. Such reactive
treatment has failed in the past,324 and seems an ineffective
method for dealing with IAP-related concerns. Worse, it puts
the health of building occupants at unnecessary risk.
Instead, the adoption of proactive legislation, specifically
tailored to deal with indoor air quality problems before addi-
tional crises develop, is clearly necessary.325 In its report, the
GAO suggested that broad mandates for the management of
320. Id. at 7.
321. According to the GAO's findings, state efforts toward addressing indoor
air concerns are chiefly aimed at mitigating current problems where and as
they occur, rather than focusing attention on preventive measures. GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 48, at 22. The report further indicates that states are having
difficulty obtaining needed funds to support those programs that are in place.
Id. at 23.
322. LAQ: Making of a Law, supra note 245, at 4.
323. For example, the CPSC's ban of urea-foam formaldehyde insulation,
which was overturned by the Fifth Circuit in 1983. Gulf S. Insulation v. CPSC,
701 F.2d 1137, 1150 (5th Cir. 1983).
324. Id.
325. See GAO REPoRT, supra note 48, at 6-7.
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IAP-related issues be granted to federal agencies3 26 so that
the current system of fragmented, inadequate and underutil-
ized authority may at last be eliminated, and the problems
associated with indoor air may be addressed more
effectively.3 27
Replacing the current system with a centralized, and
thus more effective, regulatory structure will require the pas-
sage of legislation granting the EPA authority to coordinate a
wide range of indoor air quality-related activities. Such legis-
lation must also allocate research funds to further define the
hazards associated with problems in indoor air and to search
for effective controls and technology that may be employed to
correct problems at any stage in the life of a structure. Fur-
ther, the legislation must provide for the dissemination of
useful information related to indoor air and provide guidance
for construction and maintenance of buildings and HVAC sys-
tems. The legislation must also provide a framework for ad-
dressing worker and private sector concerns and complaints
related to indoor air, and address a number of related issues
that have not yet been dealt with effectively and
comprehensively. 328
This notion of broad mandates and centralized authority
is reflected in the Senate version of the "Indoor Air Quality
Act of 1993," which would centralize much of the authority
for coordinating current and future federal indoor air efforts
within the EPA.329 In addition, the bill establishes "pur-
poseful" research activities, designed not simply to further
quantify problems in indoor air, but to evaluate the status
326. See id. at 7. The report suggests that a clear legislative mandate would
allow an agency to better direct its efforts toward addressing indoor air
problems, and would "provide a basis to prioritize funding for these efforts." Id.
327. See id.
328. The GAO cites a "limited commitment" to addressing such indoor air-
related concerns among agencies who currently have authority in this area.
GAO REPORT, supra note 48, at 6.
329. See S. 656, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(1)-(2) (1993). The bill states as its
purpose the coordination of federal research and development efforts through
the EPA, and the focusing of current efforts by a variety of federal agencies in
the area of indoor air. Id. The Senate bill further states as its purpose the
authorization of activities "to assure the general coordination of indoor air qual-
ity-related activity." Id. § 3(4) (1993).
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quo and work toward reducing or avoiding such problems. 330
For example, the Senate bill includes a requirement that
NASA conduct research, in consultation with the Administra-
tor, to assess the effective use of indoor foliage "as a means to
reduce indoor air contamination"331 and further requires the
Department of Transportation to conduct research "for the
purpose[ ] of... designing measures to avoid... indoor air
contamination."332 This is a step beyond current federal re-
search efforts because it would allow the EPA to direct and
coordinate research efforts, as well as to dictate the particu-
lar types of research to be conducted: specifically, those which
would fulfill the legislative mandate and help reduce IAQ
problems.
In addition, the Senate bill would provide a means to be-
gin closing the regulatory gap that has become apparent with
regard to SBS. Section 14 of the Senate bill creates a "Build-
ing Assessment Demonstration Program,"333 to be adminis-
tered by NIOSH, which would allow that agency to perform
in-depth assessments of buildings identified by building own-
ers and occupants as having specific IAQ problems. 334 The
purpose of such assessments is to allow NIOSH to provide a
building "assessment" which covers six "elements": (1) an
identification of suspected contaminants and the magnitude
of building contamination; (2) an identification of the prob-
able sources; (3) a review of the nature and extent of health
concerns reported by building occupants; (4) an assessment of
the relationship between identified contaminants and occu-
pant health concerns; (5) an identification of appropriate mit-
igation efforts; and (6) an evaluation of the effectiveness of
such mitigative measures. 335
The bill thus attempts to evaluate both the problems and
the proposed solutions to the problem of SBS. The bill's spon-
sor called this "expanded" form of NIOSH's current efforts a
330. Id. § 5.
331. S. 656, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b)(19) (emphasis added).
332. Id. § 5(b)(18)(B) (emphasis added).
333. Id. § 14.
334. Id. §§ 14(d)(1)-(2).
335. Id. §§ 14(b)(l)-(6).
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means to develop "the most effective measures to identify the
causes of [SBS and] to mitigate these problems."336
VII. Conclusion
Now that the Senate version of the "Indoor Air Quality
Act of 1993" has been passed by the 103d Congress, it re-
mains to be seen whether the hopes expressed by some public
interest groups that indoor air would figure prominently in
the Clinton Administration will be realized. A coalition of
public health groups concerned with indoor air has also urged
President Clinton to place a high priority on the passage of
comprehensive legislation to address indoor air issues.337
The coalition, whose members include the American Heart
Association, the American Lung Association and the Ameri-
can Cancer Society, criticized the failure of past administra-
tions to aggressively address the problems of indoor air.338
The recently-passed Senate version of the Indoor Air
Quality Act of 1993 is the best option currently available to
begin the process of comprehensively addressing the problem
of indoor air pollution. The bill, as passed, represents the
best of both worlds: it expands and coordinates current fed-
eral efforts and resists the temptation to impose further regu-
latory authority. Perhaps with the support of a wide range of
public and private organizations, and in light of the present
"atmosphere" in the White House, the current proposed in-
door air quality legislation will achieve passage this term.
336. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,683 (daily ed. October 29, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Mitchell).
337. Clinton Urged to Address Indoor Air, Workplace Smoking in Health
Care Plan, 30 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1636 (Dec. 14, 1992).
338. Id.
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